The cost of inaction: why the EU must counter Russia’s separatist agenda

As Europe commemorates three years of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow continues an escalating hybrid warfare campaign in Europe - now encouraged by Trump’s declining commitment to European security. Is the EU capable of countering this existential challenge?  

For over three decades, Russia weaponised separatist movements to destabilise post-Soviet states and undermine European unity. From Moldova’s Transnistria to Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, from Ukraine’s Donbas to Azerbaijan’s Karabakh, the Kremlin has followed a consistent playbook: fostering regional conflicts to exert control over sovereign nations, obstruct their integration into Western structures, and weaken European security. Beyond its immediate neighbours, Russia supported centrifugal tendencies within Europe, including Brexit, Catalonia’s independence push, and Eurosceptic factions in Germany, France, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Italy, and Romania.   

Yet, despite mounting evidence of this hybrid warfare, Europe stubbornly overlooked the threat and refrained from decisive action, fearing a direct confrontation with Russia. The EU over-relied on diplomatic engagement and oftentimes ‘outsourced’ security issues to external actors, mainly the US and international organisations. However, it is time to realise that European security hinges on a coherent and assertive response to Moscow.  

The post-Soviet battlegrounds

Russia’s strategic goal has long been to prevent the emergence of a strong, unified Europe. Moscow utilizes a confluence of military, political, economic, and informational tactics, each calibrated to disrupt cohesion and expand its strategic reach. One of its most effective tools is the active support of separatist movements, exploiting ethnic and political divisions to maintain instability. 

Since the early 1990s, Russia has maintained military forces in Transnistria under the guise of peacekeepers, preventing Moldova from regaining control over the region. This frozen conflict has stalled Moldova’s NATO aspirations and increased its vulnerability, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Moldova pushes toward European integration, Transnistria remains a significant leverage point for Moscow.

At the start of the year, seeking to destabilise Moldova, Russia cut off gas to Transnistria, leading to a humanitarian crisis, just 2 months after having tried to bribe Moldovan voters and skew the result of a presidential election. Transnistria remains a source of organised crime, Illegal arms trade, human trafficking, and smuggling. 

In Georgia, Russia has effectively annexed South Ossetia and Abkhazia, ensuring that Tbilisi remains blocked from NATO membership and serves as a permanent source of regional instability. Russia’s gradual "borderisation" strategy has shifted control over Georgian territory in slow increments. In 2024, Georgia saw a large political upheaval, as a pro-Russian party effectively usurped power in the country. 

The most blatant case of Russian-backed separatism is in Ukraine’s Donbas and Crimea. Since 2014, Moscow fuelled war in eastern Ukraine, ultimately launching a full-scale invasion in 2022. The outcome of this war will determine whether Russia can expand its warfare into Moldova, the Baltics, Romania and even Poland.

Russia has long played a strategic yet manipulative role in the Karabakh conflict, acting not as a peacemaker but as a balancer ensuring the conflict remains unresolved to maintain leverage over South Caucasus. By maintaining instability, Moscow secured its military presence, regional influence, and political leverage, ensuring that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan could act independently of Moscow. 

In a 2023 swift military campaign, Azerbaijan - supported by Turkey and Israel - fully reclaimed control over the region, marking a rare instance where Russian-backed separatism was successfully defeated. Moscow’s failure to protect Armenian forces and its subsequent withdrawal exposed its inability to counter a coercive power play imposed by strong regional actors. 

Today, while Armenia is recalibrating its foreign policy, moving away from Moscow and seeking stronger ties with the West, Azerbaijan is consolidating its sovereignty over Karabakh, conducting trials against key figures of the separatist regime. Among them is Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian billionaire close to Putin, appointed by Moscow to head the separatist entity. Vardanyan was detained in 2023 and is currently facing charges related to terrorism, war crimes, money laundering, and separatism. 

Before becoming known as the leader of the Karabakh separatists, Vardanyan gained notoriety as the "Kremlin’s wallet." The Troika Dialog group of companies he founded secretly transferred more than $4.6 billion to Putin's close friends between 2006 and 2013, according to an OCCRP investigation. For these offshore frauds, 22 members of the European Parliament demanded sanctions in 2019, and in 2022, 46 members of the US Congress supported personal sanctions against him. 

In February 2025, groups of Ukrainian, Romanian, and Latvian lawmakers publicly urged EU leadership to add Vardanyan and other leaders of ‘all separatist enclaves and Russian-occupied zones to international sanctions lists for their unconstitutional activities and undermining the territorial integrity of sovereign states.’

A statement by a group of Romanian MPs said that ‘legal action is necessary against all those who continue to promote Kremlin's policies in Georgia’s Abkhazia, Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea regions, as well as Moldova’s Transnistria - territories that the Kremlin has turned into zones of humanitarian disaster.’ 

‘It is time for all those responsible to be held accountable. Separatism and terrorism must be punished, and the people living in these regions must be liberated,’ reads one of the public appeals by lawmakers.

Hybrid war in Europe

Destabilising nations and undermining alliances have long become Russia’s modus operandi. In 2024, documented Russian hybrid warfare incidents in Europe surged to 44, up from 13 in 2023. It extends far beyond direct military aggression, encompassing a vast array of tactics: from disinformation campaigns and electoral interference to infrastructure sabotage and assassinations.  

Disinformation and propaganda. During the 2016 Brexit referendum, Russian state media outlets, such as RT and Sputnik, provided coverage favouring the UK's departure from the EU. More recently, Russia has orchestrated the "Children of War" campaign in Germany, showcasing images of children allegedly killed in the Russia-Ukraine war, aiming to reduce support for Ukraine. 

Cyber warfare. For years, Russian-linked cyberattacks have targeted various European countries. In 2022, Estonia faced a Russian hacking campaign, which it successfully repelled. Additionally, Russian operatives have been involved in cyber and information campaigns across Europe, aiming to destabilise societies and reduce military support for Ukraine.

Energy supply and economic manipulation. In 2022, Russia significantly reduced gas supplies to Europe via the Nord Stream pipeline, exacerbating the energy crisis and increasing inflationary pressures on European economies. Following Western sanctions, Russia banned food imports from the EU, targeting sectors heavily reliant on Russian markets, such as Polish agriculture and Baltic fisheries. The goal was to create domestic discontent and pressure governments to soften their stance on Russia.

Support for separatist movements. During the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum in Spain, Russia amplified pro-independence narratives and allegedly offered Catalonian separatists US$500 billion and a small army if they broke away from Madrid. 

Corruption and political subversion. Moscow has long cultivated ties with a network of far-right actors in Europe. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany party, known for its pro-Russia stance, has seen a surge in support, securing 20,8% of the vote in recent elections. In 2014, the French far-right party, National Front (now National Rally), received a significant loan from a Russian bank. In 2024, investigations revealed a coordinated online campaign, purportedly orchestrated by Russia, aiming to bolster far-right candidate Calin Georgescu’s candidacy in Romania’s presidential election.  

Infrastructure Sabotage. In November 2024, two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea were damaged, with suspicions pointing towards Russian involvement. Such actions disrupt critical communications and energy networks, aiming to undermine European security. 

Assassinations. In 2024, German intelligence thwarted a Russian plan to assassinate European defence industry executives. Another infamous case was the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian double agent, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, UK, using the Novichok nerve agent. 

Why the EU must finally fight back

For far too long, Europe has underestimated Russia’s capacity for evil. Despite decades of evidence, European leaders remained reluctant to confront Moscow’s aggression head-on, preferring half-measures and diplomatic manoeuvring over firm deterrence. 

President Zelensky recently cautioned that Moscow is systematically preparing for an open confrontation with NATO, a concern echoed by Estonian and German intelligence reports. While a full-scale conventional war may not be imminent, there is no doubt that Russia will escalate its hybrid operations across Europe.

Yet the Kremlin is not invincible. Its failure in Karabakh proves that Moscow’s influence can be rolled back when it meets with determined action. Russia thrives on passivity, but it retreats in the face of strength. 

The time for complacency is over; the time for decisive action has arrived.

Oleg POSTERNAK, Ukrainian political scientist, member of the Association of Professional Political Consultants of Ukraine

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Forbes United Kingdom